By: Esen Usubaliev, PhD, Dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Oriental Studies, KNU
Abstract: The escalation of tensions in the Middle East has far-reaching implications beyond its borders. This article analyzes how U.S. strategies toward Iran and the wider region potentially destabilize Central Asian trade routes and security frameworks. From the future of the North-South transport corridor to the strategic maneuvers regarding Afghanistan, we explore the precarious balance of power in a transforming Eurasian landscape.
For more than two months, the world’s attention has once again been focused on the Middle East, where there remains a high probability of another military strike by the US and Israel against Iran. Only this time, it would be on a larger scale and, possibly, of longer duration than the 12-day Iran-Israel military conflict of 2025, when the Americans joined in at the final stage.
The stakes for both sides are indeed high. Israel now fears Iran’s missile capabilities far more than the myth it itself created about the Islamic Republic’s military nuclear programme. Tehran, for its part, is not afraid to attack Israel again with its entire missile arsenal, but it is concerned about the scale of the response against US military targets in the region.
Participants in the US-Iran talks on Tehran’s nuclear programme in Oman are cautiously describing them as a ‘good start’. Against this backdrop, the growing tension extends far beyond the Middle East. Traditionally, Russia and China support Iran and advocate for the continuation of the negotiation process, calling on the US to exercise restraint. At the same time, for the first time in the history of negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programme, countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are actively facilitating the continuation of the negotiation process between the US and Iran and calling for a de-escalation of tensions. It is hard to recall a time when the US listened to the opinion of the international community on matters of war and peace. And this time, it is unlikely that the American leader will take anyone’s opinion into account, with the exception of Israel — the main culprit behind the escalation of violence and all the wars in the region.
Unfortunately, diplomacy does not preclude military preparations and other measures of pressure. As experts note, the concentration of naval and air forces and the deployment of air defence and missile defence systems around Iran have already reached the level required to launch strikes and conduct military operations over a fairly prolonged period. At the same time, Middle Eastern countries are attempting to predict the consequences of military action, which Iran itself, in particular, is warning about. The impact of the US-Iranian standoff is also being felt in other states. First and foremost, this involves the imposition of additional tariffs on imports from countries trading with Iran. This, of course, also affects the Central Asian republics, which have recently increased their trade volumes with Tehran, but the main problem lies not in trade relations and sanctions. The destabilisation of Iran or a protracted war in the Middle East not only disrupts oil transport routes (accounting for up to 20 per cent of global volumes), but also calls into question the future implementation of the North-South transport corridor, involving Russia, the countries of the South Caucasus, Central Asia and China.
Scenarios of the Future
Predicting future developments and devising scenarios is not always accurate, but it does allow us to envisage what to expect and what steps might be taken in a given situation. We understand that the US and its ally Israel view Iran as the main obstacle to their policy in the Middle East. Therefore, they will never abandon their objectives of regime change in the country, the destruction of its missile arsenal and military capabilities, as well as the groups and organisations supported by Iran.
Under the pretext of the myth of the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear programme, the US-Israeli alliance is prepared to plunge the Middle East into the abyss of a large-scale regional conflict. Naturally, human casualties have never concerned either the US or Israel.
In the event of another attack on Iran, all neighbouring countries would automatically find themselves in the zone of potential military action. The countries of the Near and Middle East, as well as the Gulf states, have no choice — they are doing everything in their power to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, but they realise that the US military presence in the region is a powerful deterrent against any form of dissent, and they will be forced to adapt to whatever outcome the situation surrounding Iran may bring. But it is also clear that without a ground operation, similar to the military campaigns in Iraq, the US will not be able to achieve all its objectives. This is all the more so given the failure of attempts to bring about a change of government by supporting internal protests in Iran in January 2026.
If a decision is taken to launch military action, it will continue until the parties deem the mutual damage sufficient to achieve their domestic and foreign policy objectives. This applies to a greater extent to the US, for whom foreign policy events often resolve domestic political issues. All the more so as Donald Trump relishes media coverage of his ‘impressive achievements’, and this aspect is undoubtedly being worked on in preparation for this phase of the confrontation with Iran. However, it cannot be ruled out that following a ‘media’ victory over Iran (in any of the possible scenarios, in Trump’s view), the most likely targets of his ‘victorious policy’ could be Central Asia and China, as he has already ‘won’ in the South Caucasus, having reconciled Armenia and Azerbaijan and established the ‘Trump Corridor’.
Waiting for Trump
It cannot be ruled out that the US regrets having withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan — military facilities on that country’s territory would be most welcome, particularly as a traditional means of exerting influence over the states of Central Asia and China. It is no coincidence that last year the US president demanded the immediate return of the Bagram base, warning that, in his words, “bad things” could happen otherwise. According to Trump, it is important to be there again “as a springboard for counter-terrorism operations” and to monitor China, which “is producing nuclear weapons near this location”.
Currently, the Taliban government, officially recognised only by Russia, is actively participating in international political life, establishing dialogue and economic relations with countries in the region. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the movement has been removed from lists of banned organisations, and other countries are also not shying away from establishing ties with Afghanistan.
Nevertheless, the potential for using this country’s territory to pose threats of international extremism and terrorism to Central Asia, China and Russia remains. Not only are terrorist groups still active in the northern regions of the IRA, but as a result of recent events in Syria, several thousand IS* terrorists have been released from prison. It is not difficult to surmise that this ‘asset’ of American foreign policy can be utilised in any direction — from Iran and Central Asia to China and Russia.
Unlike the countries of the Near and Middle East, Eurasia has a system for ensuring regional and international security, in which the CSTO plays a key role. This year, given Russia’s chairmanship, it cannot be ruled out that the organisation’s further development will involve moving beyond the post-Soviet space and gradually transforming into a key organisation for ensuring continental security in Eurasia.
The global struggle
The fact that the Americans are capable of exerting simultaneous pressure across the entire Eurasian continent — in Europe, the Middle East, the South Caucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region — speaks to this country’s significant military and political capabilities on a global scale. This is precisely why the international political situation remains tense in key regions of the world, where the interests of the US—which has never become a global hegemon—clash, with varying degrees of intensity, with those of its opponents: global and regional powers advocating not only a multipolar world order but also the right to pursue an independent foreign policy.
The last bastion of a free, diverse world and independent foreign policy, represented by Russia, China and Iran, as well as certain other states of the ‘global majority’, is the main obstacle to the formation not even of a new world order, but of the unilateral domination of the Western community. In this regard, Iran’s ability to withstand unprecedented external pressure determines the outcome of issues on a continental and global scale.
Esen Usubaliev, PhD, Dean of the Faculty of International Relations and Oriental Studies.
The Jusup Balasagyn Kyrgyz National University
